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ABBREVIATIONS 
ANC   African National Congress 
BB-BEE  Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment 
BEE   Black Economic Empowerment 
BIT   Bilateral investment treaty 
CEDAW  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women  
CERD  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
FDI   Foreign direct investment 
FET   Fair and equitable treatment 
GEAR   Growth Employment and Redistribution 
HDSA   Historically disadvantaged South African 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICSID   International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
MFN   Most favored nation 
MPRDA  Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
NDP   Non-disputing party 
NGO   Non-governmental organization 
NT   National treatment 
RDP   Reconstruction and Development Programme 
UNCITRAL  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
VCLT    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The conflict of human rights promotion and the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has become ever more relevant to the debates surrounding international relations and 
international law in recent years. While the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
throughout the world is steadily increasing, the legitimacy of international investment law 
seems to be declining. One significant reason for this backward development is that 
governments in developing and emerging countries are suffering from serious constraints due 
to the unfavorable BITs they have concluded with stronger economies. The clash lies in the 
non-compliance of many BITs with international human rights law. In South Africa, the 
government’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy was at stake because European 
investors claimed to have been discriminated against by this affirmative action program, 
aimed at increasing the economic activities of historically disadvantaged South Africans 
(HDSAs). These affirmative action policies in terms of BEE do not only encounter criticism 
that alleges them to be discriminatory in relation to white South Africans. Much rather, BEE 
is facing potentially fatal threats by the current standards of international investment law 
which in many cases favor investors’ interests over interests of public concern. This recent 
example shows the importance of the topic of the tension between investment protection and 
human rights promotion. Therefore the research question of this thesis is as follows: What is 
the nature of the cleavage between the protection of FDI in South Africa and the 
government’s efforts to protect human rights by means of BEE? Which instruments does 
international law provide in order to bridge this particular divide without neglecting either 
party’s legitimate interests? 
This work argues that the tension between human rights protection and international 
investment law is due to institutional and methodological failures in the system of 
international investment protection. The South African example shows that states are caught 
up between the need of attracting foreign investment in order to further economic 
development on one side, and the fact that they are bound to international human rights 
treaties as well as to their own social policies on the other. BEE as a measure of human rights 
promotion has already been in a situation of conflict with BITs, and is likely to arrive there 
again. In order to resolve this situation, this thesis proposes several solutions. The most 
important one is the implementation of public law standards in order to change the 
perspective of international investment law, which so far has been dominated by commercial 
law. As contemporary international investment law lacks transparency and consistency while 
6 
at the same time it is highly influential, the discipline is suffering from a severe legitimacy 
crisis. Consequently, numerous scholars have joined a discourse that aims at providing 
solutions to this crisis. The predominant set of solutions is concentrated in the comparative 
public law approach. According to this approach, international investment arbitration would 
do best if it adopted concepts of legal interpretation and procedures from the spheres of 
domestic and international public law. Besides, institutional reform is perceived as a 
necessary measure to increase the legitimacy of investment arbitration. According to most 
scholarly convictions, a revised version of international investment law would involve civil 
society in its proceedings and acknowledge the implications of its rulings for public concerns. 
Therefore, an expected consequence of the public law approach would be greater respect for 
human rights, inter alia, in investor-state arbitrations. 
This thesis shall be understood as a comprehensive approach to addressing the core problems 
of the conflict between human rights protection and foreign direct investment. This work does 
not raise the claim to develop new theories regarding the addressed problem, yet it may make 
a contribution by uniting important approaches in one comprehensive concept that provides 
both, a detailed analysis of the conflict and effective proposals for an improvement of the 
current situation.  
In order to grasp the tensions between social state policies in emerging countries that aim at 
promoting human rights, on the one hand, and the interests of foreign investors, on the other 
hand, and to find suitable solutions to the conflict, this thesis proceeds in four steps. 
The first part will reveal the tensions that have existed between South Africa’s economic 
needs and its efforts to compensate for past injustices since the end of apartheid. As it is often 
contested that South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment program is an appropriate 
means of fostering HDSAs, the second part attempts to demonstrate that affirmative action is 
a necessary measure of compliance with international human rights obligations and therefore 
deserves the protection of international law. Accordingly, an analysis of BEE from a human 
rights perspective is going to be made. The findings in the third part are going to demonstrate 
that even though South Africa’s social policies emanate from its international human rights 
obligations, contemporary international investment law is greatly disregardful of this fact. 
Much rather, it represents a serious threat to poorer countries like South Africa in their efforts 
to cope with severe domestic problems. The last part is going to analyze new legal approaches 
aimed at solving the conflict between necessary social policies and the interests of investors.  
7 
2. ENFORCING SOCIAL POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA: BEE AND 
ITS EFFECTS
2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF BEE 
BEE is a social policy launched after the end of apartheid in 1994 by the then provisional 
South African Government of National Unity (GNU) under a solid leadership of the African 
National Congress (ANC). Next to other aspects, such as developing professional skills and to 
increase household incomes within the community of HDSAs, BEE generally aims at creating 
a black business class or a class of black capitalists, i.e. HDSAs that are engaged in 
entrepreneurship or hold positions in the ranks of the economy’s upper management.
 1
 This 
applies especially to the sectors that can be referred to as the commanding heights of South 
Africa’s economy, i.e. mining, energy and finance.
2
 BEE must be understood in the wider 
terms of the objectives of the 1993 Interim Constitution and the 1996 final South African 
Constitution regarding their particular focus on equality promotion; i.e. amending the social 
and economic injustices of the apartheid system.
3
 The 1996 Constitution is far reaching in that 
it does not only “promote equality of opportunity but also of outcome”.
4
 In its early stage, 
BEE was more of a broader state motto than a concrete program, implicitly incorporated in 
the state’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and was usually referred to 
simply as affirmative action or employment equity.
5
 Obviously, in this first phase of BEE, 
right after the downfall of the apartheid regime, what the hoped-for class of black capitalists 
lacked most, was capital. This condition was partly mitigated by South Africa’s large 
parastatal sector, serving the purposes of BEE as a major “site of transformation”
6
 with its 
roughly 300 state-owned enterprises and about 300,000 employees, most notably in the 
                                                 
1
 Alan Hirsch, Season of Hope : Economic Reform under Mandela and Mbeki (Scottsville, South Africa; Ottawa: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press; International Development Research Centre, 2005), 193; David 
Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy's Promise
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 149. 
2
 Roger Southall, "Ten Propositions About Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa," Review of African 
Political Economy 34, no. 111 (2007): 73. 
3
 The constitutional focus on equality is noteworthy. For the exact wording see Constitution (Act No. 108 of 
1996) , preamble and sec. 9; Constitution (Interim), (Act No. 200 of 1993) , preamble and sec. 8 
4
 Schneiderman, 149. 
5
 Johanna Glaser and Caroline Schebesta, "Der Weg zu Fairness und sozialer Gerechtigkeit? Eine 
Transformationscharter für die Weinindustrie," in To BEE or Not to Be?: Black Economic Empowerment im 
neuen Südafrika am Beispiel der Weinindustrie, ed. Werner Zips (Münster: LIT, 2008), 197; Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (Act No. 7 of 1994) [hereinafter RDP], sec. 1.3.6. 
6
 Southall: 72. 
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financial and telecommunications sectors.
7
 The private sector was even more beneficial to 
BEE during this period, facilitating it by means of an innovative banking system, which 
generously provided black entrepreneurs with loans. Yet the Asian financial crisis during the 
period from 1997 to 1998 was a major drawback to this private sector empowerment 
mechanism. It represented the end of the first phase of BEE.
8
 The second phase of the policy 
was initiated by then-President Thabo Mbeki who endorsed the report of the Black Economic 
Empowerment Commission, a newly created advisory body to the government, mainly made 
up of black business people.
9
 According to its 2001 report, BEE 
is aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially 
and equitably transfer and confer the ownership, management and control of 
South Africa’s financial and economic resources to the majority of its citizens. 
It seeks to ensure broader and meaningful participation in the economy by 
black people to achieve sustainable development and prosperity.
10
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
In the report, the notion of blacks includes South Africans of African and Asian (or Indian) 
descent as well as coloreds.
11
 After the attempts to have a black business class emerging by 
itself predominantly as an outcome of the mechanisms of a liberalized market during the first 
phase of BEE, President Mbeki resorted to different means: He shifted toward a 
developmental state policy, meaning that BEE increasingly involved “the abandonment of 
privatization and a willingness to use fiscal benefits to engage in more far reaching social 
change and more generous budgets to attack the massive problems of poverty in the 
country.”
12
 In contrast to the first phase of BEE, the second phase introduced a broad-based 
approach in the sense that it aimed not only at increasing the amount of capital owned by (not 
necessarily many) HDSAs, but also the absolute number of black business people.
13
 The first 
bill from a catalogue of legal provisions that stirred considerable controversy was the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002, which nationalized the 
countries mining sector in order to assure the inclusion of black business people in the sector. 
This revised version of BEE has consequently caused considerable reluctance among the 
proponents of economic orthodoxy, i.e. foreign investors and the white business 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 71. 
8
 Ibid., 77. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Black Economic Empowerment Commission, A National Integrated Black Economic Empowerment Strategy
(Johannesburg: Skotaville Press, 2001), 2. 
11
 Ibid., 15. 
12
 Bill Freund, "South Africa: The End of Apartheid & the Emergence of the 'BEE Elite'," Review of African 
Political Economy 34, no. 114 (2007): 661. 
13
 Schneiderman, 150. 
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establishment, inter alia.
14
 In the third phase of BEE, the broad-based approach has been 
legally consolidated in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act of 
2003, again to counter allegations that BEE had only been advantageous to an elite of black 
business people. The law set the legal foundation for a set of codes of good practice that were 
introduced in ten industrial sectors. If companies applied for government contracts, their 
compliance with these codes, measured with government scorecards, has become a major 
selection criterion.
15
  
Broad-based BEE led to fears that South African capitalism was going to become “entrapped 
in a web of red tape”.
16
 Nevertheless, in the eyes of some commentators of BEE, the 
developmental approach of the Mbeki administration was too modest and not holistic enough 
to effectively solve South Africa’s equality issues.
17
2.2 TENSIONS BETWEEN EQUALITY PROMOTION AND ECONOMIC 
INTERESTS 
Since its start, the relationship of BEE with the economy has been complicated. The ANC 
government’s scope of determining social policies has always been fairly limited due to 
considerable political and economic constraints.
18
 In its early stages, South Africa’s post-
apartheid government put an exceptionally strong emphasis on attracting foreign investment 
in order to secure its economic development; a prerequisite for equality promotion.
19
 Yet this 
emphasis was of an extent that could barely comply with the equality provisions of the 
Interim Constitution and the RDP of 1994. The country quickly entered numerous BITs that 
did not leave much room for social policies like BEE.
20
 Consistent with this pro-investment 
policy, the ANC instantly acceeded the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on 
                                                 
14
 Freund: 671; Schneiderman, 149; Southall: 77. 
15
 Southall: 78. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 See, e.g., Neva Seidman Makgetla, "The Post-Apartheid Economy," Review of African Political Economy 31, 
no. 100 (2004): 279-280; Southall: 82. 
18
 Geeta Kingdon and John Knight, "Unemployment in South Africa, 1995–2003: Causes, Problems and 
Policies," Journal of African Economies 16, no. 5 (2007): 839. 
19
 Marianne W. Chow, "Discriminatory Equality v. Nondiscriminatory Inequality: The Legitimacy of South 
Africa's Affirmative Action Policies under International Law," Connecticut Journal of International Law 24, 
(2009): 316; Ursula Kriebaum, "Privatizing Human Rights. The Interface between International Investment 
Protection and Human Rights," in The Law of International Relations - Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, ed. 
August Reinisch and Ursula Kriebaum (Den Haag: Eleven International Publishing, 2007), 16. 
20
 Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties - Implications for Development and Human 
Rights, Dialogue on Globalization - Occasional Papers (Berlin; Geneva; New York: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
2006), 10. 
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Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which limited international 
economic competition. To give an example, TRIPS generously provided the pharmaceutical 
industry of the Global North with considerable discretion to determine the prices for 
medication. Thereby South Africa hampered its own efforts to cope with HIV/AIDS; a great 
issue in view of the high prevalence of the pandemic in South Africa, most notably among 
HDSAs.
21
 In terms of its commitment to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) the government further limited its options to engage in a 
sensible amount of protectionism.
22
However, BEE in its very beginnings – or the stance of the government on equality promotion 
in general - raised fears of expropriations through the nationalizations of private enterprises, 
which seemed a realistic threat to business owners. Yet at that time, the ANC followed a 
liberal non-interventionist approach not only internationally, but also domestically and 
assumed that a black business elite could best be empowered by means of a presumably self-
regulating market.
23
 The ANC publicly committed to this approach and succeeded fairly well 
in removing corporate fears by promoting its liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) strategy in 1996; whilst as a matter of fact, Redistribution was not the top priority of 
GEAR.
24
 At the same time, RDP was, if not formally, but in fact relinquished, which caused 
discontent within the ANC’s left wing.
25
 In this course, the “people-driven process”
26
 of RDP 
was replaced by a market-driven process.
27
 Despite GEAR, the state of the economy 
worsened, meaning that employment rates as well as FDI decreased and inequality could not 
be tackled. The failure of the strategy was most likely due to a lack of skilled workforce as a 
result of apartheid, strict protectionism in the Global North, numerous risk-averse investors 
generally refraining from investing on the African continent, and the government’s efforts to 
hastily implement new labor regulations - away from the old apartheid practices - which 
encountered significant rigidity on the old-fashioned labor market.
28
                                                 
21
 Stephen Gelb, Inequality in South Africa: Nature, Causes and Responses, DfID Policy Initiative on 
Addressing Inequality in Middle-Income Countries (Johannesburg: The EDGE Institute, 2004), 10; 
Schneiderman, 147. 
22
 Schneiderman, 148. 
23
 Adam Habib and Vishnu Padayachee, "Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa's Transition to 
Democracy," World Development 28, no. 2 (2000): 253; Schneiderman, 148. 
24
 Schneiderman, 148. 
25
 Okechukwu C. Iheduru, "Why 'Anglo Licks the ANC's Boots': Globalization and State-Capital Relations in 
South Africa," African Affairs 107, no. 428 (2008): 335. 
26
 RDP, sec. 1.3.3. 
27
 Southall: 70. 
28
 Seidman Makgetla: 269. 
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In sum, a major difficulty of governing South Africa lies in the particular tension between the 
urgent need for capital to secure economic growth on the one hand, and the need for state 
intervention for the purpose of more immediate equality promotion, on the other hand. 
Okechukwu Iheduru illustrates this situation quite well when he notes about Nelson Mandela 
that 
[h]is stance toward BEE was typical of governments confronted by minority 
domination of the economy along racial lines. They hesitate to address 
economic inequalities in order not to frighten away capital, disrupt the 
economy, and lead to a loss of skilled human resources. Mandela tolerated the 
economic subordination of the black majority in the hope of gradual 
vindication of such imbalances through autonomous but unspecified economic 
processes.
29
  
                                                 
29
 Okechukwu C. Iheduru, "Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa," The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 1 (2004): 7. 
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3. BEE: THE ANC’S COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
In order to adequately address the conflict of human rights promotion with FDI protection, the 
relationship of BEE and human rights has to be clarified. However, in terms of this work the 
assumption that by enforcing BEE, South Africa complies – or at least attempts to comply - 
with its legally binding obligations emanating from relevant international human rights 
treaties shall not be taken for granted. The issue is “hotly contested”
30
 and therefore in no way 
supposed to be ignored. Accordingly, the outcome of the next step shall prove that affirmative 
action policies like BEE can in principle be subsumed under the promotion of human rights. 
Two subsequent steps aim at demonstrating that state intervention, in general, is a necessary 
and BEE, in particular, a suitable measure to foster equality in South Africa. If the outcomes 
of all three steps are affirmative, BEE is indeed South Africa’s embracement of its duties 
under international human rights law. 
3.1 RELEVANT TREATIES 
According to the BEE Commission Report that sets out the goals of BEE, the final outcome of 
BEE shall be the achievement of “sustainable development and prosperity” by means of 
economic equality promotion. Therefore, “the imbalances” of apartheid shall be redressed.
31
South Africa has ratified several human rights treaties which contain provisions in support of 
these goals.
32
 In the following, a closer look is going be taken at the treatment of affirmative 
action policies – in contrast to mere restrictions of state behavior - in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
                                                 
30
 Luke Eric Peterson, "Investment Treaty News - Analysis: South African Arbitration May Raise Delicate 
Human Rights Issues.", International Institute for Sustainable Development, http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/itn_feb14_2007.pdf (accessed November 12, 2011). 
31
 Black Economic Empowerment Commission, 2. 
32
 For a detailed overview of South Africa's endorsement of human rights treaties see: Republic of South Africa, 
National Action Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/plan_actions/safrica.htm (accessed December 14, 2011). 
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3.1.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL 
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
CERD has been ratified by 175 states since its inception in 1965, which gives the treaty a high 
degree of significance.
33
 CERD - just like CEDAW – is a “bedrock doctrine”
34
 in the United 
Nations Charter (UN Charter) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). If it 
does not even require affirmative action, CERD at least provides a solid legal foundation for 
policies like BEE. Its preamble says that all states parties are “resolved to adopt all necessary 
measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations”.
35
Some opponents of this view, claiming that CERD does not support affirmative action, argue 
that such policies racially discriminate those ethnic groups who do not benefit from 
affirmative action and therefore cannot be in accordance with the treaty.
36
 Yet one can hardly 
imagine what kind of measure, if not affirmative action, CERD intends to promote. The 
Convention’s text is sufficiently clear about the fact that affirmative action – if it is required 
and not arbitrary -  is covered by the treaty for no longer than the period of time which is 
necessary to compensate past racial discrimination:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement 
of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as 
may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal 
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be 
deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as 
a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial 
groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they 
were taken have been achieved.
37
Article 2 is even more assertive as it does not only allow affirmative action, but requires it 
under certain circumstances; yet again, affirmative action must not exceed the amount of time 
due for compensating past racial discrimination: 
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, 
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the 
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals 
belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in 
                                                 
33
 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed December 15, 2011). 
34
 Marjorie Cohn, "Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties: United States' 
Violation of Its International Obligations," Virginia Journal of International Law 43, no. 249 (2002): 250. 
35
 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [hereinafter CERD], 
preamble. 
36
 Cohn: 251. 
37
 CERD, art. 1 (4). 
14 
no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights 
for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have 
been achieved.
38
There still is an issue with regard to the interpretation of CERD in view of some notions 
which have not yet been sufficiently defined by scholars and legal commentators.
39
 Here, 
terms such as equality or concrete measures therefore still leave some room for interpretative 
discretion. Complete legal clarity in terms of affirmative action generally, is still an 
unresolved issue.
40
 However, all things considered, affirmative action – such as BEE - is most 
likely mandated for by CERD.
41
3.1.2 THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
Since its entry into force in 1981, CEDAW has been ratified by 187 states.
42
 CEDAW 
advocates affirmative action like BEE in a similar fashion to CERD, with the exception, of 
course, that it focuses on promoting the equality of women. The member states shall thus, 
inter alia 
take all appropriate measures to ensure … the right to work as an inalienable 
right of all human beings; the right to the same employment opportunities, 
including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of 
employment; the right to free choice of profession and employment, the right 
to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service; … the 
right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in 
respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the 
evaluation of the quality of work.
43
The purpose of BEE to create a class of black business people, irrespective of their gender, 
complies with these provisions. Moreover, the Convention clearly exempts “temporary 
                                                 
38
 Ibid., art. 2 (2). 
39
 Constance De la Vega, "The Special Measures Mandate of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Race Discrimination: Lessons from the United States and South Africa," Univ. of San Francisco 
Law Research Paper, no. 08 (2009): 41. 
40
 Chow: 346. 
41
 Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Deborah Jones Merritt, "Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights 
Dialogue," The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 54, no. 3 (1999): 287; Cohn: 251; 
Andrew Friedman, "Flexible Arbitration for the Developing World: Piero Foresti and the Future of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in the Global South," Brigham Young International Law and Management Review 7, no. 37 
(2010): 45. 
42
 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed December 15, 2011). 
43
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women [hereinafter CEDAW], art. 11 
(a)-(d). 
15 
special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women” from 
being discriminatory, yet provided that they are limited in time.
44
 As a result, CEDAW 
essentially mandates for the goals of BEE, as they are in accordance with the Convention’s 
provisions and inclusive of both genders.
45
  
3.1.3 THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS  
The ICESCR is an exception among the human rights treaties endorsed by South Africa. It 
was only signed but not ratified. However South Africa’s “international obligations are guided 
by … the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, inter 
alia.
46
Another distinctive feature of the ICESCR is, that compared to civil and political rights, 
its scope of application - namely economic, social and cultural rights - lacks clarity; this is due 
to the content of the treaty which was long neglected and an ideological issue during the Cold 
War.
47
 Anyhow, Article 2 (1) of the Covenant is implicitly supportive of affirmative action as 
it obliges its states parties to actively “take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.”
48
3.1.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Marianne Chow concludes on human rights conventions and affirmative action policies that 
“[e]ven though these treaties may not be enough to establish a customary international law 
regarding affirmative action, they do show that there is support for such policies within the 
international community.”
49
 Marjorie Cohn goes even further and is convinced that, especially 
on the basis of CERD, affirmative action policies are not only admissible but compulsory.
50
For Simma and Kill, “affirmative claims” as an obligation arising from international human 
rights regimes are the starting point of their work on the conflict of FDI protection and human 
                                                 
44
 Ibid., art. 4 (1). 
45
 Cohn: 250. 
46
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rights.
51
 In sum, affirmative action can be subsumed under the state of South Africa’s 
obligations to comply with international human rights regimes under two further conditions: 
BEE shall be necessary and generally suitable to achieve its declared goals. 
3.2 THE NECESSITY OF EMPOWERMENT POLICIES 
Next to the proven possibility of subsuming BEE under affirmative action in accordance with 
the most relevant human rights treaties, BEE shall further fulfill the requirement of being a 
necessary endeavor.  
After 350 years of firm white domination in 1994, the South African economy has become 
structured in a way that was exclusively fitted to the interests of white South Africans and had 
given them the control over virtually all of its sectors; very much to the detriment of Africans, 
coloreds and Indians, whose only monopoly during apartheid was to supply the white 
economy with cheap labor. Furthermore, they were not in a position to benefit from their 
share of South Africa’s natural resources.
52
 African and colored South Africans were unable 
to get deliberately involved in running their own businesses, while the Indian minority was 
only able to do so under highly restrictive conditions.
53
 The old apartheid structures are still 
having noticeable repercussions on South Africa’s economic and social structures, 
maintaining a highly disproportionate income gap to the particular disadvantage of Africans 
and Indians (see figure 1).
54
 In the absence of perceptible equality promotion by means of 
market mechanisms alone, state intervention in the form of a social policy like BEE therefore 
seems to be a sensible – if not imperative – step; not least in order to secure the stability of 
South Africa’s young democracy as a whole.
55
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Figure 1. Distribution of household income per population group, 2005/2006 
Source: Selected data from Statistics South Africa, P0100 - Income and expenditure of households 2005/2006: 
Statistical release; P0302 - Mid-year population estimates, 2006. 
Note: As of December 8, 2011 the latest figures on income distribution published by Statistics South Africa were 
those covering the 2005/2006 period.  
Moreover, looking beyond the scope of social peace, compared to most other African states, 
South Africa’s economy is closely linked to global markets. As Africa’s strongest diversified 
economy it has an important manufacturing and service industry. A major future challenge to 
the government in order to attract investors and to foster exports is to increase the country’s 
skilled workforce.
56
 Providing better access to education and business to black South Africans 
– who represent the large majority of South Africa’s population - is therefore also advisable 
from a purely economic perspective. 
In view of the social and economic conditions in South Africa and the failure of more liberal 
policies such as GEAR, the state is obliged under international human rights law to actively 
take measures of affirmative action in order to improve the participation of HDSAs in the 
economy. 
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3.3 THE SUITABILITY OF BEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF EQUALITY 
When in 2007, Cape Town University professor of philosophy David Benatar published an 
article very critical of the concept of South Africa’s racially based affirmative action policies, 
a major debate about the effectiveness of black empowerment arose.
57
 However Benatar does 
not question the necessity of affirmative action per se as he writes about equal opportunity 
affirmative action that it 
is a badly-needed corrective to unfairness, much of which is hidden rather than 
obvious. Equal opportunity affirmative action, unlike all other forms of 
affirmative action, does not require us to enter the fetid terrain of racial 
classification and racial preference. It seeks to undo unfairness whoever its 
victims might be. … The controversy arises once affirmative action requires a 
system of racial classification and a mechanism for assigning individuals to 
racial categories, favouring some people merely on the basis of such 
assignments.
 58
According to Benatar, race is the wrong criterion to distinguish those who shall benefit from 
affirmative action, from those who shall not. Corresponding to him, affirmative action like in 
Black Economic Empowerment, as a measure which is aimed at compensating the racist 
injustices that occurred under apartheid, is therefore racist itself. Furthermore, he claims that 
affirmative action based on race is not suitable to achieving equality but counterproductive 
and unethical because 
59
[t]he more weight an affirmative action policy attaches to "race", the weaker a 
candidate of the desired "race" can be in other ways while still obtaining the 
place or position for which he or she is competing. In saying this, I am not 
making a value judgement, but stating a scientific truth. The same would be 
true if one accorded special weight to eye or hair colour, height, age, national 
origin or any other such attribute. That is simply how weights and scales work. 
Although it is a simple fact, it has implications for an ethical assessment of 
affirmative action. The more weight an affirmative action policy attaches to 
"race" the less easily it can be justified. In other words, it is less implausible to 
attach minimal weight to "race" than it is to accord it significant weight.
60
Here, Benatar may be right in implicitly asserting that South Africa’s affirmative action 
policy may to a certain extent further incompetence in professional life and cause potential 
drawbacks to the economy. Yet when he alleges that the criterion of black skin is equally 
random as hair color, height, age etc. he is – as a matter of scientific truth, as he puts it -
wrong. In contrast to race, none of the latter criteria have resulted in 350 years of 
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discrimination during apartheid, with its known fatal repercussions for the black community, 
most notably. If South Africa is willing to accept the short-term losses that may possibly 
come with favoring potentially less competent black business people – who still need to fulfill 
certain requirements - over more competent white entrepreneurs, involving its slightly more 
than 90% of non-white citizens in white collar businesses by means of affirmative action, will 
– as stated above - most likely be beneficial in the long run. Benatar concludes his article by 
stating that “[r]ejecting this policy does not in the least diminish the duty to address injustice, 
either past or present. Indeed it might help focus the mind on more appropriate methods of 
rectification.”
61
 However, Benatar remains silent and does not elaborate on such more 
appropriate, i.e. suitable steps like what he previously called equal opportunity affirmative 
action, and how they could be beneficial to solving South Africa’s severe equality problem. 
This renders his contribution to dealing with the issue fairly unconstructive. 
Apart from Benatar’s general criticism of the ANC’s racially based affirmative action 
policies, in view of their suitability to amend past injustices, there have indeed occurred 
significant problems with regard to the realization of BEE, particularly during its first phase. 
These issues have greatly challenged the credibility of the empowerment program and raised 
public doubts about its suitability to achieve the long-term goals of “sustainable development 
and prosperity”
62
. Instead of promoting a broader black capitalist class, real-life BEE has been 
alleged to mostly have created networks of corruption and nepotism and given birth to a small 
privileged class of so called BEE-llionaires. This justified criticism is chiefly a product of 
corrupt practices that have merely supplied a few select ANC members with equity shares in 
South African companies in order to increase black ownership on paper; which did not require 
genuine entrepreneurship.
63
  
Yet the government has responded to this challenge and adapted BEE by endorsing the report 
of the BEE Commission. It thereby made efforts to switch from a policy that often creates 
state-funded black fake investors to the broad-based program that aims at fostering genuine 
and more inclusive black entrepreneurship.
64
 As a consequence, BEE is presumed to have 
indeed facilitated the integration of a fair amount of HDSAs into the higher ranks of the 
economy.
65
 It is furthermore conceivable that BEE has contributed to the “dramatically 
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increased black middle class”
66
 which has been emerging in South Africa since 1994. 
However, BEE has not caused better living conditions for the majority of HDSAs, i.e. South 
Africa’s poorest people.
67
 Hence it can be said that, on the one hand, BEE is suitable for 
creating a class of black capitalists while, on the other hand, it is not sure “whether the ANC 
is doing enough to combine its empowerment strategies with delivering ‘a better life for 
all’”.
68
To conclude, one may say that South Africa’s BEE strategy is a measure of compliance with 
international human rights law as it is a necessary and suitable step in order to promote 
equality among South Africans, albeit only a limited share of them. 
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4. INVESTMENT LAW’S DISREGARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
South Africa’s affirmative action policy in the form of BEE does not only encounter 
domestic, but also international obstacles. The point at which South Africa’s social policies 
have to face these international barriers is at the center of this work.  
As seen above, this thesis presumes that BEE is the embodiment of human rights promotion 
and that for this reason it has the legal backing of international human rights law. 
Nevertheless, the legitimate interests of foreign investors – most notably the protection 
against expropriation and nationalization - are equally binding and supported by international 
law, namely international investment law. The most remarkable difficulties, which South 
Africa is sharing with numerous developing and emerging nations, arise from the provisions 
of the BITs it has concluded with the developed world and the current arbitration standards 
for the settlement of investment disputes.
69
 The upcoming section is going to follow the main 
argument that international investment law does not yet adequately take into account the 
domestic and international human rights obligations of developing and emerging host states. 
In doing so, it will analyze the underlying systemic reasons of the conflict between FDI 
protection and human rights concerns, by elaborating on the particularities of (1) FDI, the (2) 
relevant principles of international investment law as well as the (3) BIT system. At the end of 
the section, the outline of an investment dispute, which South Africa had to face as a 
consequence of its black empowerment policy – the Foresti case –, shall further illustrate how 
these systemic issues can be translated into practice. 
4.1 THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
As stated above, social policies can be a momentous tool for emerging and developing 
countries to further human rights, inter alia. South Africa’s discretion over its empowerment 
policies is limited by the rules of international investment law, as they do at times also affect 
the interests of foreigners and their home countries.
70
 Given these circumstances, and the 
costs that may incur in case of a lost dispute, “the prospects are that any number of [foreign] 
investor disputes could render BEE fiscally unsustainable.”
71
 Accordingly, one paramount 
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realm of international investment law is to govern the relationships between host states and 
foreign investors. Conflicts do often arise in cases where states interfere in the business 
activities of foreign investors by means of regulatory measures, as South Africa occasionally 
has through BEE. For such legislative actions not to unjustifiably put foreign investors at 
disadvantage, international investment law over time has developed a set of standards and 
tools that protect FDI. However, international investment law is lagging behind in taking due 
account of human rights concerns.
72
4.1.1 FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
On behalf of investors, there are two basic and plausible reasons for foreign investment: First, 
businesses may feel compelled to expand their activities into new markets if the potential to 
achieve benefits in an explored market is already exhausted due to its saturation. Second, 
there are speculative reasons, meaning that companies or individuals hoping to benefit from 
lower costs in a value chain, i.e. higher profit margins, in a country other than their own are 
prone to investing abroad.
73
 Foreign investment can be distinguished into FDI and foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI), depending on the degree of the involvement of an investor in the 
host country. Direct investors take ownership as well as the control of companies they invest 
in, while portfolio investors usually delegate the management of the business to locals in the 
host state and focus uniquely on generating capital from their ownership shares.
74
 FDI is 
furthermore different from traditional trade relations in that it usually represents a long-term 
commitment.
75
 The reason as to why these distinctions are relevant is that FDI plays a far 
greater role in investment disputes and has a significantly higher potential to influence its host 
country’s development.
76
 On the part of the receiving host state, the motivation to attract 
direct investors makes equal sense, especially when there is a special need for development: 
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FDI creates jobs, transfers specialized knowledge and skills and increases tax revenues, to 
name only a few. Yet it also bears the risk of political interference, inter alia.
77
4.1.2 THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
FDI is regulated by international investment law – also referred to as investment protection 
law -, which is particularly complicated as it is composed of “a plethora of legal instruments, 
international, national, and contractual.”
78
 Its realm spans from public international law to 
private commercial law.
79
 This complex scope and the lack of a particular conceptual 
framework for international investment law are at the origin of a current legitimacy crisis that 
this discipline is suffering from - an issue which is going to be addressed more specifically in 
the later course of this work.
80
 As to that effect, public international law has yet failed to 
provide a particular set of rules dedicated to investment law, i.e. comprehensive multilateral 
agreements. Hence to date, bilateral treaties are the predominant legal tools employed to 
regulate investor-state relationships.
81
 In contrast to the vast majority of other realms of 
international law, it is not different states that are the most significant stakeholders in 
disputes. Instead, the typical layout of an investment dispute much rather involves a host state 
and an investor as counterparties.
82
 By consequence, international investment law certainly 
shares some features with domestic public law, i.e. administrative and constitutional law and 
its typical legal relationship between a state and a private person or entity which claim a 
violation of their rights by an executive state act.
83
 The enforcement of a social policy like 
BEE can be one such example. As distinct from domestic law however, investors’ rights are 
additionally enshrined in BITs and disputes would often be settled before international 
arbitration institutions within the realm of international commercial law; a circumstance that 
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has proven unsuitable.
84
 Therefore, international investment protection is widely perceived to 
be caught up in a “commercial arbitration legacy” that does consequently not fit its scope of 
application.
85
 This deficiency is going to be addressed below in the relevant section, which is 
going to elaborate on international dispute settlement in a more detailed manner. 
4.1.3 THE BIAS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
In the following section, the general features of BITs are going to be outlined in order to 
subsequently shed light on South Africa’s contractual positioning relative to Europe’s major 
capital exporting countries. Next to the systemic pro-investor biases investment treaties 
generally dispose of, the BITs South Africa has concluded with European strong economies 
are emblematic for the little consideration that is given to human rights concerns. 
  
4.1.3.1  GENERAL FEATURES AND PRINCIPLES 
Even though outgoing capital is generally detrimental to governments, there are two important 
reasons, inter alia, that motivate the investors’ states of origin to conclude BITs so as to 
protect their nationals’ investments: First, they appreciate the potential backflow of financial 
benefits, and second, they welcome the increased competitiveness on global markets that their 
corporations may obtain.
86
 BITs have emerged from the exposure of foreign investors to the 
jurisdictions and regulatory frameworks of their host states, i.e. typical long-term investment 
risks.
87
 The particular need for the legal stability of foreign investors has made of BITs the 
most commonly applied legal instrument to regulate FDI and replaced the minimum 
protection standards of customary international law.
88
 As a consequence, by the end of 2010 
there were 2,807 BITs in force.
89
 As the purpose of BITs is to protect investors, they do not 
impose enforceable obligations on them; while accordingly, they usually do not imply rights 
available to states.
90
 The first BIT was concluded in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan, 
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whereas the largest number of BITs entered into force during the 1990s, coinciding with a 
boom of FDI.
91
 In the vast majority of cases, BITs exclusively regulate either the investment 
relations between one industrialized and one developing nation, or between two developing 
states. The main reason therefore is that states commonly have general legal security concerns 
due to frequent deficiencies of the rule of law in less developed states.
92
  
BITs are negotiated and concluded within the frameworks of diplomatic relations, under the 
exclusion of civil society. In view of the vital implications major investments may have for 
the public of a host state, this contracting mechanism suffers from an “acute participation 
deficit.”
93
BITs are almost entirely based on a compendium of so called model BITs.
94 
These templates
follow a certain pattern that begins with a preamble, stating the parties’ motives and the 
treaty’s purpose which, in accordance with Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of the Treaties, can be significant for interpretations in terms of potential arbitration.
95
Furthermore, all model BITs include the definitions of investment and investor as well as the 
absolute and relative standards of equal treatment.
96
 As the exact meaning of these principles 
remains “notoriously vague”
97
, the following description thereof will merely consider the 
minimum consensus on the catalog of included aspects, as found in the relevant literature.
98
The absolute standards are (1) fair and equitable treatment (FET) as well as (2) full protection 
and security. Absolute in contrast to relative signifies that these standards are rights which are 
granted to investors regardless of how others are treated. The relative standards of non-
discrimination are composed of the (3) most favored nation (MFN) and (4) national treatment 
(NT) rules. Accordingly, they regard the treatment of investors in relation to the treatment of 
other foreign investors or the host country’s nationals.
99 
Threats to the legitimate expectations of investors traditionally materialize in terms of 
expropriations and nationalizations, most notably.
100
 The scope of these expectations is 
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enshrined in the FET standard. Yet the exact meaning of FET is vague and may vary from 
case by case.
101
 However, the consensus subsumes under FET conditions such as basic 
vigilance and protection, transparency, procedural propriety, good faith, and the absence of 
abuses of authority.
102
 In short, the FET standard in BITs shall serve as a guarantee for the 
investor’s legal security.
103
 The full protection and security standard signifies “a state’s 
responsibility to protect its foreign investors against damages caused by the state itself or by 
private persons as a result of state action or omission.”
104
   
MFN treatment protects an investor from being treated less favorably than an investor from 
the host country or a third state.
105
 The NT standard forbids host states to treat foreign 
investors worse than domestic investors.
106
 Furthermore, BITs usually determine the 
conditions of potential dispute settlements, i.e. the settlement procedures including the 
tribunal, and the choice of law.
107
 Provisions that take into account domestic obligations of 
host states in general, and human rights provisions in particular, are absent from the vast 
majority of BITs.
108
 However, this issue is going to be addressed more thoroughly in the later 
course of this work, next to further approaches eligible to facilitate greater consideration for 
human rights in international investment law. 
As the result of this section, one may say, that BITs dispose of a strong systemic pro-investor 
bias.
109
4.1.3.2  SOUTH AFRICA’S UNFAVORABLE TREATIES 
South Africa’s first BIT, concluded with the United Kingdom in 1994 and entered into force 
in 1998, has for the most part served as a model for the fourteen BITs South Africa has 
subsequently signed with other capital-exporting developed European countries. Most of these 
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were signed during the 1990s.
110
 After the end of apartheid - as mentioned above - the new 
South African government was in need of quickly attracting foreign investment. To these ends 
the officials in charge were apparently willing to make major concessions during the 
negotiations of their new BITs. However, a lack of expertise may as well have contributed to 
those concessions.
111
 Besides, one must not forget South Africa’s interests in exporting its 
local products that may have led to compromises in the process of drafting BITs.
112
 The UK 
model BIT is greatly generous toward investors and “has proven inadequate in addressing the 
needs of a developing country such as South Africa”.
113
 In the UK model, the concessions to 
the European contracting parties are expressed in the particularities of the treaty text: First, the 
preambles do not include any developmental, social or human rights purposes, but merely 
focus on creating “favourable conditions for greater investment” and welcome “prosperity in 
both States”.
114
 Second, investments are defined broadly, which leaves no room for South 
Africa to restrict the influx of potentially harmful investments in coherence with its social 
policies. Third, the full protection and security, MFN, NT and FET standards are accorded to 
European investors to their highest possible extents.
115
 Another major disadvantage the South 
African negotiators have accepted is the option for investors, in case of a dispute, to 
immediately call for international arbitration without being obliged to first exhaust the 
domestic legal path of South African jurisdiction.
116
 It is understandable that an investor may 
justifiably fear the potentially biased jurisdiction of a host state - especially in a state where 
the rule of law is weak.
117
 The major drawback of this provision however, lies in the 
possibility of an investor to evade to a jurisdiction that is likely to be much less concerned 
with South Africa’s broader policies such as BEE than a domestic court would be.
118
                                                 
110
 Chow: 318; International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Overview of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Concluded by South Africa, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (accessed November 10, 
2011). 
111
 Cf. Chow: 330-331; Jacob, 22; Gus Van Harten, "Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical 
Discussion," Trade, Law & Development 2, no. 1 (2010): 23. 
112
 Alatovik and others, 4; Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties - Implications for Development 
and Human Rights, 39. 
113
 Chow: 318. 
114
 Cf. Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties - Implications for Development and Human Rights, 
10; Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Cm 4039) 
(August 1998) [hereinafter South Africa-UK BIT], preamble. 
115
 Chow: 327; Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties - Implications for Development and 
Human Rights, 10. 
116
 South Africa-UK BIT, art. 8 (1). 
117
 Dolzer and Schreuer, 214. 
118
 Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties - Implications for Development and Human Rights, 21. 
28 
Giving one possible explanation as to why states agree to consent to such disadvantageous 
agreements, Marc Jacob finds “that, from a regulatory perspective, BITs involve a type of 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’: states would be better off if they collectively rejected restrictions of 
their regulatory capacity in the form of BITs, but capital-importing countries are individually 
tempted to conclude investment agreements to gain a competitive advantage.”
119
4.1.4 THE FLAWS OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The permanent courts in charge of investment arbitration are the World Bank’s International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington D.C., the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, the London Court of Arbitration and the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Ad-hoc arbitration according to the standard rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is a further possibility 
to settle investor-state disputes.
120
 The present work will only pay further attention to ICSID 
arbitration as by virtue of most BITs it is the main forum of investment disputes.
121
 Since 
1966, 147 states have accepted ICSID jurisdiction.
122
 In addition to this, the rising number of 
cases settled by ICISD demonstrates the growing need and importance of ICSID 
arbitration.
123
 For these reasons, the potential impact of ICSID-generated case law on the 
development of investment law standards may not be underestimated.
124
 Furthermore, ICSID 
does not substantially differ from other mechanisms in that the entire international legal 
regime for foreign investment is being criticized in view of its preferential treatment vis-à-vis 
capital-exporting countries and its disregard of human rights concerns, most notably in 
developing countries.
125
The main feature, which all international investment arbitration procedures have in common, 
is that the disputing parties may freely choose the law to be applied and have the authority to 
appoint the tribunal.
126
 Therein lays one flaw of the ICSID dispute settlement mechanism: 
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Most eligible arbitrators have a commercial law background and are therefore presumed to 
lack sensitivity, flexibility and due expertise in order to make proper considerations with 
regard to human rights issues.
127
 The latter would require arbitrators to look quite beyond the 
legal scopes of BITs and thoroughly analyze the social context of the particular case at 
hand.
128
 As a consequence, ICSID arbitrators are often perceived as strict legal positivists who 
would in an inflexible fashion, usually abide by the texts of BITs. One may at times as well 
suspect a certain degree of judicial bias and question there impartiality, as traditionally, ICSID 
arbitrators have also served as legal counsels to foreign investors.
129
  
Another particular feature of investment disputes is that they do not follow fixed rules. The 
inconsistencies emanating from this kind of flexibility justify fears of significant legal 
uncertainty.
130
 The reasons for this circumstance can be found in the ad-hoc character of 
tribunals – even with regard to ICSID, as arbitrators are elected on a case-by-case basis.
131
Legal uncertainty is further due to rare reference to precedent cases that may foster consistent 
legal practice.
132
 In the few cases where non-investment rules may be part of the obligations 
deriving from a BIT, there are no fixed procedural rules on how to deal with such 
provisions.
133
 Arbitrators have at times even been reluctant to dealing with non-investment-
related provisions and have avoided such tasks by professing conflicts with procedural 
matters.
134
Transparency is a further major issue because civil society has only very limited possibilities 
to follow legal disputes. Awards may increasingly be published; however the arguments 
brought forth by the parties to a dispute are in most cases not available to the public.
135
International investment arbitration sets a particular focus on confidentiality, which of course 
contradicts the principles of transparency and public representation of domestic approaches; 
particular features which are commonly perceived as essential to a strong rule of law.
136
However, the inclusion of non-disputing parties (NDPs) - also referred to as amici curiae -
seems to be increasing. In case their involvement is accepted by the tribunal, they may serve 
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as experts, giving specialized advice to the arbitrators. However, their participation is 
restricted to them being granted to inspect the written proceedings of a dispute and submit 
their recommendations without actively participating in hearings.
137
The origins of this entire catalog of flaws must be seen as a result of the historic and unguided 
process of the jurisdictional evolution of international investment arbitration. It is an 
outgrowth of international commercial arbitration. Thus it can be seen as an anachronism that 
still follows the procedures as well as the enforcement mechanisms of commercial 
arbitration.
138
 This deficiency which has already been addressed above, translates into 
confidential arbitration behind closed doors and widely inaccessible to the public. As 
commercial arbitration traditionally does not involve jurisdiction over public policies, this 
practice has further culminated in a condition which effectively allows privately-contracted 
arbitrators to take governmental decisions.
139
  
In sum, there is still significant potential to harmonize, update and thereby give new 
legitimacy to international investment dispute settlement standards. In effect, this could likely 
avoid situations in which human rights concerns conflict with investors’ interests. 
4.2 THE “FORESTI” CASE: A RESULT OF SYSTEMIC DEFICITS 
The case Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa (Foresti case) 
is a well suited and repeatedly taken example to illustrate the deficiencies of current 
international investment law standards with regard to the little consideration they accord to 
public policy interests.
140
 More concretely, it is the practical example of a conflict between 
investor-friendly BITs and South African BEE provisions. The Foresti case was finally settled 
out of court, by mutual agreement of the parties, leaving many questions unanswered.
141
 It is a 
typical model for the legal uncertainty inherent to current international investment arbitration, 
with regard to investor-state disputes over public policy concerns. In this course, the Foresti 
case shall further provide an illustrative context to briefly touch upon the subject of 
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expropriation under international investment law, while emphasizing the legal uncertainty that 
often accompany it, given the current conditions of investment arbitration. 
The Foresti case was initialized on November 8, 2006, when ICSID received a complaint 
from seven Italian nationals as well as Finstone s.à.r.l., a company incorporated in 
Luxembourg, against the Republic of South Africa.
142
 These investors (Foresti et al.) were 
involved in the granite mining business and accused the government of South Africa of their 
unlawful expropriations, most notably. In this manner South Africa would have breached its 
BITs with Italy and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union. The subjects to the complaint, 
causing the alleged violations contested by Foresti et al., were two BEE policies: the Mining 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002 on the one hand, and the 
Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining Industry 
(Mining Charter) on the other hand.
143
4.2.1 BEE MINING LAW: AN ANNOYANCE TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act of 2002, which entered into force in 2004, was the 
first pivotal initiative during the second phase of BEE.
144
 It represented the first hard law 
measure in terms of BEE, which up until then could be characterized as soft law.
 145
 A main 
goal the South African Government wanted to achieve with the MPRDA was “to substantially 
and meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons … to enter the 
mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation's mineral 
and petroleum resources.“
146
 Consistent with its aforementioned intention to lift HDSAs up to 
the commanding heights of the economy, the government aimed to gain control over the 
country’s natural resources by introducing a system of licensing that investors – foreign as 
well as domestic ones – would have to adhere to. According to this new system, the old order 
mining rights of private corporations were converted into newly emitted licenses – or new 
order rights. Owners of the old order were therefore required to reapply for a right to convert 
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their titles to new licenses to be able to continue their operations.
147
 Thereby the access of 
HDSAs to the upper ranks of the mining business was supposed to be ensured in conformity 
with South Africa’s overall constitutional goals.
148
 Consequently, the 2002 Mining Charter, 
which was enacted by virtue of the MPRDA, provides that within ten years at least 26% of the 
mining operations be owned by HDSAs.
149
 It must be noted that the Mining Charter already 
represents a substantial concession to equity markets as its first draft intended a 51% 
ownership share for HSDAs. Yet the ANC could not withstand the pressure exerted by South 
Africa’s well organized major mining companies who had encountered a significant decline in 
the prices of their stocks.
150
 The industry was largely critical of the Mining Charter, and even 
more rigid to accepting the original draft’s 51% share.
151
 The fact that this earlier version of 
the Mining Charter was not officially publicized but leaked, may be another sign of the 
controversies that surrounded the MPRDA - and perhaps hard law BEE in general - within 
South Africa’s political circles.
152
4.2.2 ALLEGATIONS AND OUTCOMES 
The major allegation of Foresti et al. was made in relation to indirect expropriation as they 
regarded the new order mining rights as in inferior in value compared to their old order rights, 
which they would neither have to reapply for nor sell a share thereof to HDSAs within a given 
time frame.
153
 As opposed to direct expropriation, an “indirect expropriation leaves the 
investor’s title untouched but deprives him of the possibility to utilize the investment in a 
meaningful way”.
154
 Nowadays, indirect expropriation is much more common than the direct 
variety, as directly expropriating a foreign investor is very likely to meaningfully harm a host 
state’s reputation.
155
 In order to assess whether an indirect expropriation has unjustifiably 
materialized, “ICSID traditionally has looked to whether an expropriation occurred under 
international law. According to this standard, an expropriation occurs where constructive 
expropriation is found to have taken place and where the effect on the owner is found to be 
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tantamount to an expropriation.”
156
 This definition already suggests that the uncertain scope 
of expropriation under international law “remains a deeply contentious issue”.
157
 Accordingly, 
in the Foresti case, opinions are equally diverging.
158
However, this work does not intend to determine as to whether an unjustifiable expropriation 
according to the current standards of international investment law has actually taken place or 
not. Much rather, it points toward the legal uncertainty that is sustained and puts some 
necessary social policies at stake. 
The fact to note is that a judgment to the detriment of the South African government could 
very well have been made.
159
 The settlement by mutual agreement in late 2010 has spared 
South Africa expensive compensation payments; however, it had to bear the large majority of 
the arbitration costs, amounting to fairly more than five million euros.
160
 In the long run, 
however, BEE would become unaffordable, if South Africa was to be indicted on a frequent 
basis.
161
 Given the legal insecurity that currently is inherent to international investment law, 
equality promotion, i.e. human rights, in South Africa and other concerned countries may be 
at stake. 
Marc Jacob puts the essence of the case in a nutshell when he finds that “the law here is far 
from settled, with the battle lines drawn between those who claim the purpose of a state 
measure plays a crucial role in deciding on its lawfulness and those denying this.”
162
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5. INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO INVESTMENT LAW  
Had the disputing parties not settled their conflict out of court, the long awaited outcome of 
the Foresti case – a subject to speculation - may potentially have not been in favor of South 
Africa’s efforts to promote equality. As no such award has materialized, there still remains 
considerable legal uncertainty with regard to investment arbitration outcomes. Such 
uncertainty is very likely to have severe repercussions on developing countries that aim at 
assuming their responsibilities for the promotion of human rights, especially.
163
 Thus the 
present work’s last part shall elaborate on possible solutions to this far reaching deficiency in 
international investment law. It is going to provide an analysis of relevant approaches that are 
currently part of the discourse among scholars and aims at presenting solutions to the conflict 
between paramount public interests and the legitimate expectations of foreign investors.  
In a first step, a widely discussed public law approach is going to be introduced. The 
approach aims at creating investment arbitration outcomes that take major public concerns 
duly into account. They shall furthermore create a sensible amount of legal certainty in 
investment disputes. The last section discusses a set of policy options, available to states that 
need to insulate their domestic policies from the legal interferences of foreign investors. 
Where appropriate, the South African example shall illustrate possible implications if such 
approaches were to be applied in practice. 
5.1 STRENGTHENING PUBLIC LAW STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
As a result of the current legitimacy crisis international investment arbitration is suffering 
from, a comparative approach that aims at transferring ever more public law principles to 
international investment law, has since recently become a dominant view among scholars, 
with Stephan Schill leading the way:  
The public function of international investment law consists of establishing 
principles of investment protection under international law that provide for the 
protection of property and endorse rule of law standards for the treatment of 
foreign investors by states. These principles have the purpose of reducing the 
so-called “political risk” inherent in any foreign investment situation. In that 
sense, the substantive principles of international investment law, therefore, 
assume a function that is much closer to that of domestic constitutional and 
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administrative law than to private law and commercial contracts negotiated 
between equals.
164
The yet known underlying assumption is that commercial law is no longer an appropriate 
basis for investment arbitration. Therefore, the approach suggests the “need for a relatively 
deferential standard that minimizes the second-guessing of state policies and the direct 
balancing of state and investor interests”.
165
 The principles to be integrated in international 
investment law range from public international law standards to aspects of domestic 
administrative law. The first section of this part is going to address domestic and international 
public law techniques of legal interpretation that are eligible to make their way into 
international investment law. The second section focuses on the potential of institutional 
reforms with regard to dispute settlement mechanisms. The last section is going to assess the 
potential implications of amici curiae participation in investment disputes in view of public 
interests. 
5.1.1 COMPREHENSIVE STANDARDS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
There are two promising methodological approaches that may provide arbitrators with an 
appropriate set of tools of interpretation, in order to achieve a fair balance between the 
protection of the legitimate expectations of foreign investors and human rights concerns.  
  
5.1.1.1  ARTICLE 31 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
 The simple fact that “BITs are not created in legal vacuum but in a system of public 
international law”
166
, may have inspired Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill to view BITs in the 
context of international public law as a whole, which, of course, includes human rights 
regimes. Accordingly, investment arbitrators may have yet failed to consistently consider the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
167
 Article 31, the 
Convention’s general rule of interpretation, provides in section (3) (c) that “any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”, shall be taken into 
                                                 
164
 Schill, "Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations 
of a New Public Law Approach," 59. 
165
 William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, "The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in Investor-
State Arbitrations," in International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, ed. Stephan W. Schill 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 719-720. 
166
 Jacob, 31. 
167
 Simma and Kill,  691. 
36 
account when a treaty, including a BIT is interpreted.
168
What we seek to confirm is the fact that a State's obligations with regard to the 
basic welfare of its citizens has unquestionably become a matter for 
community interest. Since these norms have taken the first steps away from 
bilateralism, it is possible that norms relating to economic, social, and cultural 
rights could also constitute 'rules applicable in the relations' among States, even 
if there is no independent treaty obligation running between the States in 
question ... In close cases, the fact that the Vienna Convention's preamble 
proclaims the States Parties' 'universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all' may tip the scales towards a broader 
conception of applicability.
169
In the Foresti case, such legal practice would have taken into account the fact that next to 
South Africa, both Italy and Luxembourg have ratified the relevant human rights treaties, 
South Africa tries to comply with by means of BEE. In this case, South Africa’s switch from 
new order to old order mining rights would presumably not have been regarded as an 
unlawful expropriation. However, this approach is not enforceable. So far, there has not been 
much support for this strategy that aims at harmonizing the various realms of international 
law.
170
5.1.1.2  PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
As the public law approach draws on domestic methods of public and administrative 
adjudication, proportionality analysis has made its way into this comparative concept. 
Proportionality analysis stems from German administrative law and is also used by German 
arbitrators to adjudicate constitutional complaints.
171
 The principle has equally made its way 
into the European Court of Human Rights, for instance, where it is referred to as fair-balance-
test.
172
 Proportionality analysis is “a method of legal interpretation and decision-making in 
situations of collisions or conflicts of different principles and legitimate public policy 
objectives.”
173
 In the words of Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathew, it is a “preferred procedure 
for managing disputes involving an alleged conflict between two rights claims, or between a 
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rights provision and a legitimate state or public interest”.
174
 In other words, proportionality 
analysis examines the relationship between the aims of a particular government action and the 
proportionality of the methods applied to achieve the defined goal.
175
  
To give such an example: in the Foresti case, the aim of the government action was to achieve 
equality while the method or means is equivalent to the MPRDA and the Mining Charter. 
There are two conflicting legally protected interests involved: South African equality 
promotion on the one hand, and the property rights of Foresti et al., on the other hand. The 
aim of proportionality analysis is to achieve a fair balance between the two. The method 
involves three core elements the “(1) the principle of suitability, (2) the principle of necessity, 
and (3) the principle of proportionality stricto sensu”.
176
  
The first step shall determine „whether the measure adopted by the state or government 
agency serves a legitimate government purpose and is generally suitable to achieve this 
purpose”.
177
Applied to the case, the mining laws do undoubtedly serve a legitimate purpose, i.e. equality 
promotion, which is enshrined in widely accepted human rights treaties. BEE is also generally 
suitable to realizing this purpose. However, if there are doubts concerning the suitability of 
BEE as it is not highly inclusive of all HDSAs, one may add that a government needs a 
certain scope for decision-making: it cannot predict if a measure is suitable or not. A 
sufficient amount of legislative discretion needs to be granted. Kingsbury and Schill address 
this issue by stating that “only very few measures will not pass this part of the suitability test, 
as good faith actions by governments will usually not involve the use of means that are 
wholly ineffective in pursuing the stated purpose.”
178
The second step shall determine “whether there are other, less intrusive means with regard to 
the right or interest affected that are equally able to achieve the stated goal”; it “requires that 
there is no less restrictive measure that is equally effective”.
179
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In response to this requirement, it must be said that affirmative action measures are a 
necessity in view of the social conditions in South Africa. The fact that the ANC had already 
tried to create a class of black business people relying on market mechanisms alone, and not 
succeeded shows that less restrictive means than affirmative action are unlikely to exist. 
Moreover, the Mining Charter has reduced the original 51% of black ownership to 26%. This 
modest share in contrast to the total rate of 80% HDSAs in South Africa does not seem 
intrusive. 
The third and last step of “proportionality analysis involves a balancing between the effects of 
the state measure on the affected right or interests and the importance of the government 
purpose”, which is referred to as proportionality stricto sensu. It “requires that the measure is 
not excessive with regard to the objective pursued and the relative weight is given to each 
principle”.
180
 This phase just applies if the measure under review passed the previous steps. A 
judge’s task is here is to weigh “the benefits of the act”.
 181
Analyzing proportionality stricto sensu would require arbitrators “to take into account the on-
the-ground-reality”.
182
 By this means, they would be more likely to assume responsibility; and 
comprehend the far reaching consequences that their decisions could mean for a state as a 
whole if they judge a government measure. “Without proportionality analysis, the concept of 
indirect expropriation, for example, risks degrading to an analysis without rationalization.”
183
Applied to BEE in South Africa, where ICSID’s award may have had fatal repercussions, if 
made in favor of Foresti et al., proportionality analysis seems to be a promising approach. 
5.1.2 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
According to the public law approach, the investment dispute settlement system is equally in 
need of an institutional reform. 
Investment treaty arbitration, in turn, can be understood as more akin to 
administrative or constitutional judicial review than to commercial arbitration, 
even though international investment law makes use of the arbitral process to 
settle disputes between states and foreign investors. Yet, despite the functional 
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equivalence to domestic public law, international investment law lacks a 
comparable conceptual and doctrinal clarity.
184
However no other body able to arbitrate independently and more efficiently could be 
identified.
185
 Nevertheless, there are several changes to be made in order to improve the mode 
of operation of the international investment dispute settlement system. Penusliski defines four 
fundamental innovations with regard to the problematic features of ICSID: (1) “strengthening 
mediation procedures” that aim at finding solutions addressing “both parties’ interests”, (2) 
establishing an appellate body, (3) “enabling judicial interpretation that considers the 
importance of other international commitments and the demands of domestic governance” and 
(4) “setting up a screening mechanism for arbitrator and mediator selection”.
186
 This chapter 
focuses on two main features of an ICSID-reform, the appellate body and the screening 
mechanism for the selection of arbitrators, as the integration of “various legal interpretation 
techniques”
187
 has been discussed in the previous section.  
The objective of an appellate body is the provision of “a public forum for the review of public 
disputes“ in order to “create a determinate and coherent jurisprudence”.
188
 This is inasmuch 
necessary for ICSID, as “there is no higher standing body to correct tribunals’ determinations 
and ensure uniform application of international investment law or the ICSID Convention”.
189
Such a body would encourage both, a decent occurrence of decisions and strengthen the 
court’s legal argumentation, as ICSID still lacks reliability and legitimacy.
190
 The non-
existence of an appellate body substantially diminishes judicial constraint as the prospects for 
the tribunal’s awards are that they will not face any review.  
Furthermore, the selection of arbitrators needs to be proceeded “in a more neutral manner 
through the procedural frameworks of choice, which would further strengthen the legitimacy 
and acceptance of the process”.
191
 According to the ICSID Convention, arbitrators must be 
“qualified persons”
192
 with “high moral character” and “competence in the fields of law”.
193
Yet, there was no criticism of potential corruptibility of the tribunal. Nevertheless, “there 
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exists little formal control over the overall group of professionals who serve on ICSID”, 
which is also a lack of legitimacy to the tribunal.
194
 In order to address such issues, a code of 
conduct for arbitrators that includes ethical rules, such as fairness and neutrality could be 
adopted.
195
 Additionally an amendment to the ICSID Convention in order to e.g. allow the 
disputing parties to select ICSID arbitrators from a register, would make the system of 
arbitrator selection more transparent. In “conjunction with an appellate body” the arbitrator’s 
conduct could be reviewed and create a system of checks and balances.
196
All these innovations together might lead to a stronger and more legitimate ICSID. However, 
challenging the rationale of ICSID remains difficult: for most of the addressed proposals, 
amendments to the ICSID convention would be necessary, which, in turn, would require 
consensus among all member states.
197
  
5.1.3 AMICI CURIAE: REPRESENTING CIVIL SOCIETY IN INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 
A further step toward public law standards of taking into account general interests in investor-
state arbitrations is the participation of amici curiae, or non-disputing parties (NDPs). This 
applies “in particular when neither investor nor state are minded to invoke human rights 
points”
198
, which may often coincide with little government accountability and interest in the 
promotion of human rights on the domestic level.
199
  NDP participation took place for the first 
time in the Methanex Corporation v. United States (‘Methanex’) arbitration in 2001, when the 
tribunal allowed the submission of a non-governmental organization (NGO) as amicus. Since 
then, amicus curiae participation has been occurring increasingly in investor-state 
arbitrations.
200
 Art. 37 (2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides the legal foundation for 
this new feature of the investment dispute settlement system; a result of an amendment in 
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April 2006.
201
 The integration of observers has two main advantages: first, the impartiality of 
disputing parties and arbitrators is likely to be compensated and second, significant expertise 
is provided to tribunals.
202
 NDPs become particularly relevant, when the claims relate to 
social, cultural and economic human rights.
203
Amicus participation is also endorsed by governments: The US model BIT, for example, 
includes a clause which provides that “[t]he tribunal shall have the authority to accept and 
consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party“.
204
The inclusion of article 37 (2) in the ICSID arbitration rules can be explained by the 
perseverance of NGOs that have long been a part of international relations and international 
law.
205
 It is therefore not surprising that they “have also successfully petitioned tribunals for 
the right to participate in arbitral proceedings trough submissions of written briefs on issues of 
interest to them”.
206
 Another reason for the “call for non-party participation … is chiefly 
grounded on the claim of a legitimacy deficit inherent in the application of private 
commercial arbitration procedures to investor-state dispute settlement”.
207
 As argued above, 
an important part of the legitimacy issue stems from the ever-recurring lack of public 
participation in international tribunals.
208
 To render amicus participations genuinely effective 
though, the publicity of arbitrations needs to be assured. An important step toward greater 
transparency would be to grant public access to documents or at least provide the entire 
catalog of written arbitration proceedings to non-disputing parties.
209
In the Foresti case, two amicus submissions were made: first, by a group of NGOs following 
up with human rights and environmental topics, and second, a group of international lawyers, 
the International Commission of Jurists, whose main interest was to arrive at a certain level of 
legal certainty with regard to questions of international law by means of the tribunal’s 
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decisions.
210
 A particular novelty in the Foresti case was that the tribunal revealed the 
arbitration records to NDPs “without the consent of the disputing parties”.
211
  
Thus the main feature of the amicus in investment arbitrations is to “offer its views on 
important public interest considerations arising from the dispute, and, to an extent, to 
represent those considerations”. NDP participation may not only contribute to representing 
public concerns in a particular trial but also to politicizing international investment 
arbitration.
212
 Integrating amici curiae may by these means establish a desirable “connection 
between a dispute and those who are affected by its outcomes”
213
 and “similarly increase the 
efficiency of the system”.
214
 The Foresti case is even said to have been settled without severe 
consequences for South Africa “because of the barrage of negative publicity it received”.
215
To conclude, the recent evolution of ICSID’s arbitration rules with regard to amicus curiae 
participation shows that current investment law provisions are in no way static. Therefore, 
moving toward greater consideration for public concerns in investment arbitration seems not 
to be a necessarily unfeasible endeavor. 
5.1.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Transferring public law standards of legal interpretation to the realm of international 
investment law does not mean doing an injustice to foreign investors. The public law 
approach must merely be understood as a tool that is more suitable to prevent a pro-investor 
bias – or any bias – that happens to occur frequently throughout investment dispute 
settlements. As a consequence, if affirmative action policies such as BEE went too far in 
contradicting the legitimate expectations of investors, they shall still be judged unlawful. 
Common experience with domestic administrative jurisdiction does not give an indication of a 
particular lack of justice inherent to this approach. Besides, if legal insecurity were to be 
replaced by consistent arbitration, each party shall benefit from such innovation; even if not to 
equal extents. The approach would therefore most likely be substantially beneficial to solving 
the conflict of human rights and the protection of foreign investors at the systemic level. 
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5.2 STATE POLICY OPTIONS: RENEGOTIATING TREATIES 
Next to solutions that aim at amending the entire system of investment arbitration, there are 
further diplomatic options within this system already that deserve attention.  
In order to better ensure their regulatory independence to address human rights issues, 
countries like South Africa might as well follow the recommendations made by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and renegotiate their BITs.
216
 The United States and 
Canada for instance, have included clauses and notions in their model BITs that allow them to 
ensure public interests.
217
 The preamble of the United States’ model BIT, for example, 
prescribes that investment protection be “consistent with the protection of health, safety, and 
the environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights”.
218
 Further 
sensible adaptations to BITs include a revision of the standards of treatment clauses, i.e. FET, 
MFN and NT or even an insertion of investor obligation clauses.
219
Consequently there is some, albeit limited hope for South Africa’s BEE policies in two cases: 
first, if South Africa’s presumably strong European BIT counterparties’ commitment to 
human rights finds its way into their BITs, by means of conviction or public pressure; and 
second, if South Africa manages to review and renegotiate its BITs in a manner that protects 
public welfare interests.
220
  
However, given the aforementioned problem of South Africa’s apparently weak bargaining 
power, the second case is rather unlikely to materialize. In very general terms, and by means 
of perception, “states are unlikely to make explicit provision for human rights in their 
international agreements relating to investment.”
221
 Furthermore, foreign investors might as 
well become hesitant to invest in South Africa if the relevant BITs made investments too 
risky; and due to the fact that competitors are unlikely to rest.
222
  At least for the time being, 
there are no signs that South Africa would have seriously renounced its unfavorable BITs 
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with strong exporting economies. Nevertheless, there are commentators like Okechukwu 
Iheduru that contradict this view: 
[S]tates still govern. Globalization equally exerts tremendous competitive 
pressures on corporations to beat other firms in order to capture market shares, 
and/or appease shareholders and institutional investors worried about the 
bottom line. In some cases, these firms act less like rational profit-maximizing 
enterprises and more like mercantilist states who view access to state 
procurements, business incentives, and subsidies from a zero-sum perspective. 
Consequently, they are willing to accept some state intervention or 
compromise, especially if such action advances the interests of capital as 
well.
223
If Iheduru is right, the ANC could increase its bargaining power over foreign investors and 
the states that negotiate BITs on their behalf. Consequently, state policy options to advance 
BEE must not be rejected as a whole. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has pointed toward the particular difficulties of the conflict between the legitimate 
expectations of foreign investors and human rights promotion, which was illustrated by a 
South African example. The work has furthermore analyzed a set of legal solutions that might 
be of help to solve this conflict. 
The major difficulty of governing South Africa lies in the particular tension between the 
urgent need for capital to secure economic growth on the one hand, and the need for state 
intervention for the purpose of more immediate equality promotion, on the other hand. With 
BEE being a measure of equality promotion in line with relevant human rights treaties and 
furthermore necessary and suitable to implementing them, South Africa is fulfilling its 
obligations to comply with international law. 
On the other hand, BITs – which are equally binding obligations - dispose of a strong 
systemic pro-investor bias. One possible explanation as to why states consent to such 
unfavorable agreements is their competitive disadvantage within the international economic 
system. Consequently, states are on the horns of a dilemma. However, this work finds that 
there is still significant potential to harmonize and revise current standards. Thereby new 
legitimacy may be attributed to international investment dispute settlement procedures.  
For the solution of the conflict, this thesis finds several approaches that might have a 
significant impact if they were implemented altogether. First, a public law standard of review 
needs to be introduced to the international investment dispute settlement system. The 
approach aims at creating investment arbitration outcomes that take major public concerns 
duly into account and shall furthermore create a sensible amount of legal certainty in 
investment disputes. A consistent application of the VCLT when interpreting rules of 
international law would lead to a more appropriate consideration of all relevant international 
rules and do justice to complex contexts of application of law. Proportionality analysis can be 
seen as a practical method to integrate domestic public law standards into international 
investment dispute settlement systems. This method examines the relationship between the 
aims of a particular government action and the proportionality of the methods applied to 
achieve the defined goal. Thereby, public law standards, as applied by other international 
courts, would enter international investment arbitrations. Furthermore, an institutional reform 
of ICSID, including the creation of an appellate body and a rethinking of the selection-system 
for arbitrators, as well as the admission of non-disputing parties to investment arbitrations 
46 
could contribute to a resolution of the known conflict of interests. Finally, several state policy 
options, e.g. the renegotiation of BITs in order to include human rights norms complement the 
range of possible solutions to solving the tension between FDI and human rights. 
By taking the South African example, this work has shown that there are several different 
approaches regarding the solution of the addressed tension. The full range of aspects within 
this discussion cannot be covered by this thesis, but it tried to highlight the main aspects 
within the theoretical legal debate. But several problems still persist. Although many of the 
proposed approaches that circulate among scholars seem elaborate, practical solutions may 
still be difficult to achieve. The institutional reform of ICSID, for example needs the consent 
of all member states, which is fairly unlikely to materialize. A further aspect that may not fall 
into oblivion regards the distribution of interests in international relations. To states, attracting 
foreign investment and thereby creating prosperity and economic growth, is in many cases 
much more important than sincere human rights promotion. This applies even more to 
developing countries. This circumstance illustrates the initial problem of this thesis: BITs are 
very often concluded with states that do already suffer from human rights deficits. 
A comparative analysis of select developing and emerging countries with regard to their FDI 
policies and human rights standards seems to provide a tempting incentive for further 
research. The thesis concludes with the words of Jan Eliasson who stresses the 
interconnectedness of human rights, development and peace; and consequently the importance 
of achieving a balance between all three: 
[L]asting solutions require that the pursuit of peace, development and human 
rights must take place in parallel. There is no peace without development; there 
is no development without peace; and there is no sustainable peace and 
development without respect for human rights. If one of these three pillars is 
weak in a nation or a region, the whole structure is weak. Therefore, walls and 
barriers between these areas must be taken down.
224
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